The dialogue of the board and its chairman with investors is an established practice in many countries, such as the United Kingdom, the USA, the Netherlands, Belgium, France and recently also Germany. In the UK this dialogue covers the whole range of relevant board topics, certainly including good corporate governance aspects such as the composition of the board and the remuneration of the directors as well as good corporate culture and ethics in the corporation. In Germany this dialogue may also take place between the chairman of the supervisory board and institutional investors; this is firmly established in the practice of most of the DAX-30-corporations, and some other corporations follow the trend. This practice is taken up by many codes of good corporate governance, for example in the UK Corporate Governance Code 2014 and the UK Stewardship Code 2012 as well as in the Corporate Governance Codes of France, the Netherlands, Belgium, the USA and since 2017 also in the German Code. The investor dialogue involving the chairman of the board, both in the one-tier and the two-tier systems, is legal and legitimate, but it has three main limits: insider trading and market abuse, company secrets, and equal treatment of the shareholders. The latter limit creates practical problems which are met by the various codes in different ways. While the competence for investor relations is primarily with the CEO viz. the chairman of the management board, the chairman of the (supervisory) board should also be available -within reasonable limits -to discuss supervisory board-related issues with investors. This has been rightly suggested by the German Corporate Governance Code, though it has met with certain doctrinal concerns. In many countries this dialogue is not restricted to the chairman of the board but extends to other board committe chairmen, to the senior independent directors and sometimes to all directors. It can be expected that the chairman of the board's dialogue with investors will sooner or later not only become a general practice, but that it will also be considered to represent good corporate governance.
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The dialogue involving the chairman of the (supervisory) board is a recent, very controversial topic in Germany. 1 In its revision of February 2017 the German Corporate Governance Code has for the first time dealt with this dialogue, 2 and this has met with criticism both as to this new provision and as to the Code in general. The German discussion concentrates nearly exclusively on the supervisory board and its chairman and his competence to engage in such a dialogue, which normally would be up to the chairman of the management board. Yet from a
French and international perspective the topic is broader, namely as suggested by the title of this article: The investor dialogue of the chairman of the board, both in the one-tier system and the two-tier system. The practice of this dialogue is common in a number of countries, for example in the UK, the USA, the Netherlands, France and more recently in Germany. Legal questions both as to the competence of the board and as to the permissible content and legal limits of such a dialogue come up in all of these countries. Yet in most of them the issues are dealt with in their national corporate governance codes, not in the stock corporation laws.
I. The Practice in the UK and Germany
In the UK and other countries
In the UK the dialogue between institutional investors and not only the board but, more specifically, non-executive directors is common practice and considered to be good corporate governance. 3 This dialogue covers the whole range of relevant board topics, certainly including good corporate governance issues such as the composition of the board, the remuneration of directors, good corporate culture and ethics in the corporation. But it extends to other topics too, such as strategic planning, risk and capital structure. Many corporations in the UK contact the shareholders who are of importance for the corporation, for example the twenty to thirty largest shareholders in the enterprise register. They offer them a dialogue with the board chair and as a rule also the chairman of the remuneration committee. If investors come forward and ask for such a dialogue, the corporations are usually ready to comply with their wishes. Also chairmen of other committees, for example the chairman of the audit committee, are available for separate dialogues. A very important part of the dialogue deals with the composition of the board. This allows the investors to express their suggestions and wishes as to the performance of the present members, the structure and diversity of the board and possible new expertise and candidates, well before the issues come up in the next general assembly.
A similar dialogue takes place in the USA 4 and other countries like the Netherlands, 5 Belgium 6 , France 7 and others as well. 8 It seems that this dialogue is a general common practice in most countries, though this does not necessarily mean that it is generally acknowledged that good corporate governance requires such a practice.
In Germany
In Germany the dialogue with investors is usually a component of the management board's efforts at investor relations. But today such a dialogue may take place also between the chairman of the supervisory board and institutional investors; this practice is firmly established in most of the DAX-30-corporations, and some other corporations follow the trend. 9 This dialogue with the chairman of the supervisory board usually takes place once a year, be it before the general assembly or after an evaluation of the board or well ahead of the general assembly if changes in the membership of the board are planned. In the latter case it usually takes place six to nine months before the general assembly. If the corporation is in a critical situation, there are ad hoc telephone calls or personal meetings with important investors. Usually the dialogue is with only one investor, not with a group of them, and is held at the seat of the corporation. Roadshows with the chairman of the supervisory board are rare. As in the UK, board composition and criteria for the nominations of new members of both the management and the supervisory boards are key topics, though individual candidates are not part of the dialogue. The control of the management board by the supervisory board, including the supervisory board's role in the strategy of the corporation, may be discussed too.
II. Legal and Self-Regulatory Responses Themen Gespräche zu führen." "Aufsichtsratsspezifisch" in German is somewhat narrower than "Supervisory Board-related", this should be kept in mind when we come later on to the possible topics for the dialogue. The original proposal of the Commission went further than the present version in one important point. The Code distinguishes sharply between "shall" ("soll"), as found in the proposal, and "should" ("sollte"), 14 as found in the present version. In the first case this would have been a "recommendation" which, while of course not binding, would nevertheless have required that any deviation from it must be disclosed under § 161 of the Stock Corporation Act. The present version has been softened to a mere "suggestion", which the board might consider but which it can drop without further ado and without having to disclose this fact. The reactions to the new suggestions of the Code (and the Guiding Principles) have been mixed. 17 The institutional investors and large corporations as well as portions of the financial press and academia approved of them. 18 Others, in particular other corporations, lawyers and traditional academia, criticized them, some very harshly. Most of the criticism was doctrinal, namely related to the role of the German supervisory board. 19 This board is traditionally considered to be merely an "internal organ", i.e. an organ with the sole task of internal control and advice, with investor relations being the exclusive domain of the management board.
Practical reservations concerned the need for corporations to have a one-voice policy and the danger of difficult relations between the chairmen of the management and supervisory boards.
As to these fears, which seem unfounded, see part III of this article. 26 While in some other countries, including Germany, the need for a special Code for institutional investors is rejected, there is common agreement that institutional investors do not only actually play an important role for the corporations, but that they also have a certain legal or quasi-legal responsibility.
2. Limits of these relations both for one-tier and two-tier boards and their chairmen a) Insider trading and market abuse While the general practice and importance of the company and board's investor relations are undisputed, the limits on investor relations and specifically on a dialogue with shareholders outside of the general assembly are often neglected both in the Codes and in the surrounding discussion. The first and obvious limit is the general prohibition of insider trading and market abuse. This limit is a subtle one, and it has been discussed in the context of the legal duties of directors in roadshows and meetings of the board with financial analysts. 27 If inside information is disclosed in these contexts, whether purposely or inadvertently, it must be disclosed immediately to the general public. This applies to the dialogue of the board with justified and therefore may not be characterized as arbitrary." 31 The German Code says this in different words: "All other things being equal, the corporation will ensure equal treatment of all shareholders in respect to information." 32 There is a considerable body of case law allowing differentiation between ordinary small shareholders and shareholders who have an entrepreneurial stake or interest, 33 for example if the board wants to get the latter to participate in an envisaged capital increase. 34 But as far as the investor dialogue is concerned, the German discussion has just begun, and the recently acknowledged roles -of stewardship and responsibility -placed upon institutional investors have not yet been taken into consideration more generally. In my view dialogue by the board with institutional investors outside of the general assembly is justified if the board considers it to be in the interest of the corporation and if no new material inside information is distributed to the public ahead of the ad hoc-disclosure. 35 The question however remains: Even if this dialogue is justified, how can an informational imbalance between the participants in the dialogue and other shareholders be leveled out? The UK Code mentions the problem in a footnote: "Nothing in these principles or provisions should be taken to override the general requirement of law to treat shareholders equally in access to information." 36 It then proposes a duty of information in the annual report. 37 "Direct face-to-face contact" with "major shareholders" is mentioned and is obviously considered to be lawful, but no details are given. The German Code goes further: "The corporation shall disclose to shareholders, without any undue delay, all new material facts made available to financial analysts and similar addressees." 38 The French and the Dutch Codes are stricter.
According to the French Code: "Toute communication doit permettre à chacun d'accéder en même temps à la même information". 39 And the Dutch Code says: "Analysts meetings, analysts presentations, presentations to institutional or other investors and press conferences should be announced in advance on the company's website and by means of press releases. … All shareholders should be able to follow these meetings and presentations in real time, by means of webcasting, telephone or otherwise. After the meetings, the presentation should be posted on the company's website." 40 The Belgian Corporate Governance Code recommends that the company enter into a dialogue with shareholders, in which the company is to treat all shareholders equally. 41 For this the company should design a disclosure and communication policy promoting an effective dialogue with shareholders and potential shareholders, for example by the organization of information sessions to which all shareholders should be invited. 42 In the USA selective disclosure is dealt with in the Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD)
Rule 100(a). It covers new issuer disclosure to certain enumerated persons (in general, securities market professionals and holders of the issuer's securities who may well trade on the basis of the information) and requires the issuer to make public disclosure of that information. If the selective disclosure was intentional, the disclosure must be simultaneous.
If it was non-intentional, the information must be made by a method that is reasonably designed to effect broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the information to the public. 43 The US Corporate Governance Code 2016 of the Business Roundtable acknowledges this, but adds: "Communications with shareholders are subject to applicable regulations (such as Regulation Fair Disclosure) and company policies on confidentiality and disclosure of information. These regulations and policies, however, should not impede shareholder engagement. Direct communication between directors and shareholders should be coordinated through -and with the knowledge of -the board chair, the lead independent director, and/or the nominating/corporate governance committee or its chair." 44 To sum up, it can be said that the board may indeed have face-to-face contacts with major
shareholders, but such contact may also be extended to other shareholders if this is in the interest of the corporation. In such a dialogue no privileged material information may be given away; rather, only already known information may be explained. At a minimum all new material facts made available in such a dialogue must be promptly disclosed. It may be advisable to go further and to allow other shareholders direct access to the dialogue, but this goes far and cannot yet be considered to be generally acknowledged good corporate governance.
Competence for the dialogue
a) The CEO viz. the chairman of the management board
The primary competence for a company's dialogue with investors is of course in the hands of the CEO or, in a two-tier system, the chairman of the management board. In the German discussion many traditional voices maintain this without further ado and without seeing the legal problems. First, as discussed before, there are important limits on this dialogue also for the chairman of the management board, and, second, there are areas which do not fall into the competence of the CEO or the chairman of the management board and for which there must be a company organ available to inform the public if this is in the interest of the company.
One example relates to cases in which the CEO or the chairman has a conflict of interest.
Another example, in the two-tier system, is when discussion concerns the composition and work of the supervisory board itself.
b) The chairman of the supervisory board
In Germany the controversial discussion on the investor dialogue focuses on the role of the supervisory board and its chairman, and insofar it is very specific. What is undisputed is the fact that if the supervisory board is competent to give information to shareholders and decides to do so, it is the right and the duty of the chairman of the supervisory board to do so. But when is there a competence of the supervisory board to speak to the public?
In order to answer this question, one should remember that the main task of the supervisory board is to oversee the management board. Today it is commonly agreed that this control is not restricted to an ex post control but that it also comprises an ex ante control and advice function. Furthermore the law contains a number of provisions which expressly state that the supervisory board and its chairman may make declarations to the public, be it within the general assembly or outside of it. 45 This is true, for example, for the yearly comply or explain declaration under § 161 of the Stock Corporation, for the corporate governance declaration under § 289a of the Commercial Code, and for the joint statement of the management and the supervisory boards in cases of a takeover under § 27 of the Takeover Act. These examples and a number of other specific competences of the supervisory board suggest that the traditional view of the supervisory board being a merely internal organ (Innenorgan) is dated.
The correct view seems to be that the supervisory board cannot be excluded from speaking to the public if the matter is within its own competence and if speaking to the public is in the interest of the corporation.
In practice, the following matters should be treated as being in the competence of the supervisory board and can be discussed with investors: the composition and compensation of the supervisory board, the nomination and dismissal of the management board as well as its compensation, and the cases in which the management board has a conflict of interest. The most difficult case is the strategy of the corporation. In the above-mentioned Guiding Principles, Number 5 ("Strategy development and implementation") is formulated very carefully: "The development and implementation of the corporate strategy is the responsibility of the management board. In the context of a dialogue with investors, the supervisory board can explain its participating role within the strategy process and its assessment of the implementation." 46 The criticism brought forward against this principle is unfounded. The supervisory board, too, is involved. The Stock Corporation Act shows this quite clearly: "The management board must inform the supervisory board on the intended business policy and other fundamental matters regarding the future strategy of the company (in particular finance, investment and personnel plans". 47 Reports of the management board on transactions which may have a material impact upon the profitability or liquidity of the company must be made sufficiently early, if possible, to enable the supervisory board to express its opinion before such transactions are entered into. 48 Quite apart from this provision, it is not only ex post that the supervisory board is responsible for monitoring whether the strategy is implemented; it is also to be done ex ante, and this is particularly true for important organizational duties and the corresponding control.
Much of the criticism stems from the fear that the supervisory board will go forward with the dialogue single-handedly and thereby expose the management board and weaken its position in the public. In order to avoid this, the Guiding Principles state: "The supervisory board discusses with the management board the basic principles of the content and format of the dialogue with investors." 49 It is generally acknowledged that the organs of the corporation have a legal duty of loyal cooperation, 50 and it is obvious that the corporation must speak with one voice. Normally this discussion between the two boards viz. between their chairmen will take place before the first dialogue commences. In this discussion the two boards may even agree on laying down general principles for such a dialogue in their corporation; in Germany one speaks of a so-called "Kommunikationsordnung".
Once the competence of the supervisory board for an external investor dialogue is accepted, it is questionable whether, internally, the chairman can proceed in his own discretion or whether he or she needs a resolution of the whole board for going ahead. This is a question relating to the rights and duties of the chairman vis-à-vis the board as a whole, and it may be regulated differently in the various jurisdictions. In Germany the role of the chairman of the supervisory board vis-à-vis his board is relatively limited. 51 Therefore the chairman will be well advised to secure an informal general agreement of the board for having such dialogues with investors. On the other hand, having to seek agreement for each individual dialogue and even having to obtain a formal board resolution for this would be too much and cannot be seen as being required by the law. In any case, if the board does not oppose the dialogue, it is up to the chairman of the board to have the dialogue with the investors since the chairman represents the board in the public.
c) Other directors
As said before, the controversy in Germany is mainly about the competence of the supervisory board in the German two-tier system, and those who reject this competence of the board and its chairman would be even less willing to agree to a role of other directors in such a dialogue. Here, a quick look at how other countries deal with this question may be helpful. The new Commission also endorsed the other modifications made by the former Commission as of February 2017. For the purpose of this lecture, it must suffice to enumerate these modifications without further analysis. 58 One of the controversial modifications was an addon to the foreword: "These principles not only require compliance with the law, but also ethically sound and responsible behavior (the "reputable businessperson" concept, Leitbild des Ehrbaren Kaufmanns)." Then the role of institutional investors is addressed. New recommendations concern the compliance management system, whistleblowing, variable remuneration of the management board, the composition of the supervisory board, more specification regarding the voting proposals, specification of which of the supervisory board members is considered by the supervisory board to be independent, disclosure of the curricula vitae of new candidates for the supervisory board and better financial information apart from the half-yearly finance report. Relations with shareholders. This latter Code is under revision, and it is planned to have a new version by 2018, but it seems that the fundamental structure of the Code will be kept.
Of course the overhauling of the Code will mean that the whole content of the Code will be put to the test. Among the pressing problems are, for example, the independence of the supervisory board members, the competence needed (in particular also digital competence), evaluation, diversity, business culture and business ethics, risk management and internal control, and in particular remuneration. But the new Commission has not yet mentioned where it will put its focus apart from assuring that there will be a long and comprehensive public discussion.
